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Abstract
This paper studies the causal effect of education on income uncertainty
using a broad measure of income which encompasses unemployment risk.
To accomplish this, the variance of residuals from a Mincer-type income
regression is decomposed into unobserved heterogeneity (known to the
individuals when making their educational choices) and uncertainty (un-
known to the individual). The estimation is done using Finnish registry
data. The marginal effect of having secondary or lower tertiary level ed-
ucation decreases income uncertainty. University level education is found
to have a small positive marginal effect on income uncertainty. The ef-
fect of education on income uncertainty is roughly similar for men when
compared to women, but income uncertainty is larger for men than for
women regardless of education. Contrary to some results from the U.S.,
the role of unobserved heterogeneity is found to be very small.
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1 Introduction
Return to education is perhaps the most widely studied causal relationship in
contemporary economic literature. A central message from this literature is
that measuring monetary return to education is complicated by endogenous
selection. Endogenous selection arises simply from the fact that people who
choose different levels of education levels are likely to differ from one another
in some dimensions unobservable to the researcher. Neglecting this unobserved
heterogeneity may potentially introduce a large bias.
Monetary uncertainty in return to education has received much smaller em-
pirical attention. Since the return to education is not constant among indi-
viduals and materializes possibly only several years after the choice of educa-
tion has been made, educational investment has an inherent uncertainty to it.
Analogously to estimating mean returns to education, endogenous selection also
complicates the estimation of uncertainty in monetary returns to education.
The measure of earnings uncertainty used throughout this paper is the vari-
ance of yearly income. For example, a direct comparison of income variances
between university and high school educated people might give an incorrect pic-
ture of the effect of education on income variance, because we cannot observe
counterfactual income streams of the same people with different education lev-
els. Consequently, the observed variance of income may not be a good measure
of uncertainty, because it is comprised of two distinct components: unobserved
heterogeneity and uncertainty. The intuition for this dichotomy follows from
private information: wage uncertainty, or risk, is the part of the wage variance,
which is not foreseeable by the decision-maker.
Unobserved heterogeneity (due to, for example, individual ability, motivation
and general taste for education), on the other hand, is the portion of the wage
variance which is known to – and acted on by – the individual, but not observed
by the researcher. The unobserved heterogeneity is intimately related to private
information on potential returns to education possessed by individuals. For
example, if a person knows that her personal return from a given education
level is particularly high, she will most likely choose that level of education.
Disentangling unobserved heterogeneity (which stems from private information)
from true uncertainty from the point of view of the agent making the schooling
decision is instrumental when studying income uncertainty.
The question of how education affects income uncertainty is also of policy
relevance. If, for example, more educated agents face larger income uncer-
tainty, risk-averse agents might choose less education than would be socially
optimal. This would suggest that income transfers supporting higher education
are socially beneficial. On the other hand, if the earnings differences within
an education group can be explained by unobserved heterogeneity rather than
uncertainty, there might be less room for insurance against uncertainty.
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This paper studies two interrelated decompositions. First, I correct for self-
selection by modeling the selection of education level. Second, I decompose the
uncertainty of income into a permanent component, which reflects fixed charac-
teristics of individuals and a transitory component, which reflects idiosyncratic
shocks to income streams of individuals. The transitory component is allowed
to vary by time and by education level.
I follow Chen (2008) who extends the framework of Roy (1951) into more
than two sectors. Chen disentangles potential variance and unobserved hetero-
geneity from one another, while taking into account the fact that the selection
of agents into educational categories is endogenous. Chen estimates her model
using data on U.S. males. She finds that the uncertainty-education profile is
U-shaped; the most and least educated individuals face the highest income un-
certainty. In addition, according to her model, unobserved heterogeneity is
estimated to be up to 20 percent of the total earnings uncertainty.
The dependent variable in Chen’s paper is average hourly wage. Her ap-
proach disregards perhaps the most important source of earnings uncertainty;
namely, the risk of unemployment. Instead of hourly wages, this paper studies
yearly total taxable income, which, in addition to income from employment,
includes unemployment benefits and other taxable transfers. This measure ar-
guably gives a more complete picture of the income uncertainty related to a
level of education. This is particularly relevant because international evidence
suggests that differences in unemployment risks between education groups may
be substantial (Guiso et al., 2002) and have widened in recent decades (Ace-
moglu & Autor, 2011). Using total taxable income as the measure of income
also mitigates the problem of endogenous selection into employment, as people
are observed even if they are not working. The model presented in this paper
is estimated using Finnish data. An attractive featur e of the Finnish tax code
for the current purposes is that virtually all of the income transfers, including
unemployment benefits, are taxable and are therefore observed.
I also depart from Chen’s approach in another way. Namely, I estimate sep-
arate models for men and women. In most similar studies attention is limited to
men, because female workforce participation in most countries has been much
lower until recent years. Nonetheless, the female workforce participation in Fin-
land has been similar to male workforce participation already from the 1990s,
which warrants doing a similar analysis also for females. Furthermore, since
both female education and female workforce participation has also increased in-
ternationally, I find that calculating comparable measures for males and females
is also interesting in its own right from an international perspective. As a result,
I am able to test whether there are differences in the amount of uncertainty in
career paths between men and women.
To ensure that the schooling and income equations are jointly identified,
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an appropriate instrument, which affects schooling but does not appear in the
income equation, is needed. I use local differences in supply of education proxied
by the region of residence in youth as an instrument. Even though I am able
to control for a wealth of family background and individual characteristics,
endogeneity of the instrument can not be ruled out. It turns out, that even an
analysis using a possibly endogenous instrument is informative.
The association between mean earnings and its variance has been studied,
among others, by Palacios-Huerta (2003), Hartog & Vijverberg (2007), Diaz-
Serrano et al. (2008) and Schweri et al. (2011). The aforementioned papers do
not find any robust relationship between education group income means and
variances. This may be related to the fact that none of these papers address
the possible selection effects.
In addition, the current paper nests two other prominent research themes.
First, I explicitly allow for heterogeneity in the return to education. In this
sense, the approach of paper is related to models used to study heterogeneous
returns to schooling (e.g. Aakvik et al. 2010 and Abadie et al. 2002). Second, the
approach chosen here is related to Cunha & Heckman (2008), Cunha et al. (2005)
and Cunha & Heckman (2007), all of which study how the private information
of individuals is related to their choice of education, but do not discriminate
between permanent and transitory components. The approach of Chen (2008)
is also applied in Mazza & van Ophem (2010) and Mazza et al. (2011).
As a preview of the results, I find that income uncertainty decreases up to the
tertiary level of education. University educated individuals face slightly larger
earnings uncertainty compared to people with a tertiary level education. For
men, however, this effect is not distinguishable from zero. In addition, men face
higher income uncertainty in comparison to women regardless of their education
levels. Moreover, the estimates for the role of unobserved heterogeneity are
found to be very small compared to estimates from the U.S.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the de-
tails of the Finnish schooling system. Section 3 introduces the empirical model.
Section 4 presents the data used. Section 5 presents the first and second stage
estimates. In addition, Section 5 studies the robustness of the results to relax-
ation of parametric assumptions. I present the uncertainty estimates, compare
them to the results acquired using data from the U.S. and discuss how possible
endogeneity of the instrument affects the interpretation of the results in Section
6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 Brief description of the education system in
Finland
The Finnish system of education consists of three stages. The first stage is
compulsory education (9 years), which gives eligibility to apply for a secondary
education. Secondary education (3 years) is provided by academically oriented
upper secondary and vocational secondary schools. After completing secondary
education, people apply to tertiary education (3-5 years), which is offered in
universities (master’s level) and polytechnic colleges (lower tertiary level).
There are two stages of selection. First one takes place after comprehensive
school when students are about 16 years old. Students have an opportunity to
apply to an academically oriented upper secondary school or to a more practi-
cally oriented vocational school. The second stage of selection takes place when
people apply for tertiary education. In addition to upper secondary school
graduates, also vocational school graduates are allowed to apply for tertiary
education.
Tertiary education is offered in universities and polytechnic colleges. The
focus of universities is research whereas polytechnic colleges are more practi-
cally oriented. Graduates from polytechnics are able to apply to universities to
continue their studies. There are no tuition fees at any level. In addition, a
student benefit of roughly EUR 400 monthly is offered to students over 18 not
living with their parents.
I use a categorical education measure, Si, with four distinct categories to
capture the salient features of the Finnish education system. Each individual i,
is placed into one of the schooling categories, which are
• Si = 1; compulsory education,
• Si = 2; secondary education (both vocational and upper),
• Si = 3; lower tertiary education,
• Si = 4; university level education.
As the data does not allow me to identify dropouts, I classify people according
to their highest completed level of education.
3 Empirical model
3.1 Model for potential incomes
This section introduces the empirical model used in this paper. The setup is
adopted from Chen (2008). It is an extension of the classic Roy (1951) model
into more than two sectors.
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The stylized model consists of two periods. In the first period, individuals
choose their levels of education according to their tastes. In the second period,
they face a yearly income stream which depends on the level of education they
have chosen and gets an income stream which depends on personal characteris-
tics (both observed and unobserved) and education and time specific transitory
and permanent shocks. I observe a panel of N workers over T years. In the first
observation year each worker has already chosen and completed their preferred
level of education. The potential log-income of person i with schooling s in year
t is given by
ysit = yitI (Si = 1) + yitI (Si = 2) + yitI (Si = 3) + yitI (Si = 4) , (1)
where I (·) is an indicator function having a value of 1 if Si = s (s = 1, 2, 3, 4)
and 0 otherwise. The potential wage formulated in (1) gives rise to an income
regression equation of the form:
ysit = αs + xitβ + σsesi + ψstεit, ∀ Si = s. (2)
In (2) αs is the mean earnings for a schooling level and xit is a vector of observ-
ables. The error term consists of two parts. The time invariant fixed effects are
incorporated in σsesi. ψstεit denotes transitory shocks, which are assumed to be
uncorrelated with both the observable characteristics and the fixed effect. The
potential wage variance within a schooling level in year t is therefore σ2s + ψ2st.
Variation in σ2s is the variance of individual specific fixed effects that are con-
stant in time but may vary across schooling levels. ψstεit, on the other hand,
may vary with both time and schooling level. esi and εit are assumed to be
N(0, 1) distributed random variables.
It is assumed, that each individual chooses their level of education according
to their preferences. This is formalized by a standard latent index model
S∗i = ziθ + vi, (3)
where S∗i represents the optimal level of schooling chosen by individual i. The
latent schooling factor vi is a N(0, 1) random variable. It summarizes the pri-
vate information such as taste for education, unobservable ability and income
expectations (including possible risk aversion), which are known to the individ-
ual but unobservable to the researcher.1 zi contains the elements in vector xi
and an instrument, which is assumed only to affect level of education but not
income.
1In particular, vi is assumed to capture both pecuniary and non-pecuniary utility compo-
nents.
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The predicted schooling level Si depends on S∗i by
Si = 1 if −∞ < ziθ + vi ≤ κ1,
...
Si = 4 if κ4 ≥ ziθ + vi >∞.
(4)
The cutoff value, as = κs−ziθ, is the minimal level of the unobserved schooling
factor for which individuals choose s.
The model has three unobservable elements, esi, εit and vi. They are assumed
to be jointly normal with the structure esiεit
vi
 ∼ N
 00
0
 ,
 1 0 ρs0 1 0
ρs 0 1
 , (5)
where ρs ∈ [−1, 1] . Intuitively (5) implies that the unobservables in the school-
ing equation may be correlated with permanent earnings differences, but they
are assumed to be uncorrelated with the transitory shocks. Therefore, the pos-
sible selection bias only contaminates the estimation of the permanent com-
ponent. The transitory component captures macroeconomic shocks and insti-
tutional changes which affect all individuals symmetrically and are therefore
uncorrelated with vi. The structure of the unobservables is assumed to be com-
mon knowledge2.
Correlation between the fixed effect and the unobserved schooling factor ρs
has a central role in the model: it captures the selection effect. If ρs > 0,
the unobservables in schooling and earnings equations are positively correlated,
the selection effect is positive and workers with high income potential get more
education. If ρs < 0, people with high income potential tend to enter labor
markets at a younger age. Consequently, ρs also governs the magnitude and
the direction of the bias in the OLS estimates: if ρs > 0, OLS overstates the
true return to education and if ρs < 0, OLS understates the true return to
education.3
From the point of view of an individual making her schooling decision, the
expected log-income is given by
E [ysit | si = s, xit, vi] = αs + xitβ + σsρsvi, (6)
2The assumption of common knowledge of shock parameters is needed for the subsequent
analysis. Even though this assumption might seem unrealistic, results from survey data (e.g.
Schweri et al., 2011 and Webbink & Hartog, 2004) and structural models (e.g. Charles &
Luoh, 2003) support the assumption that students have at least some knowledge of their
potential post-schooling income.
3Cameron & Heckman (1998) discuss, which types of economic models would rationalize
the ordered structure given by Equations (3), (4) and (5). Most importantly, they conclude
that vi has to be independent of the level of schooling, i.e. vsi = vi ∀ s.
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where the term σsρsvi represents the channel through which individual schooling
factors affect the potential wage.
Since agents are assumed to know their own draw of vi, a proper measure
of income uncertainty should account for vi. The unforeseeable component of
log-income, or income uncertainty from the point of view of an individual, is
measured by the deviation of realized income from its mean conditional on
unobservable vi and observables xit and Si
τ2st = V ar [σsesi + ψstεei | xit, Si = s, vi]
= σ2s
(
1− ρ2s
)
+ ψ2st. (7)
Equation (7) can be rearranged to σ2s + ψ2st = σ2sρ2s + τ2st. It shows that the
residual variance of equation (2) consists of two parts: unobserved heterogene-
ity (σ2sρ2s) and uncertainty (τ2st). Income uncertainty is governed by the perma-
nent and transitory components (σs and ψst) and the correlation between the
unobserved schooling factor and permanent component ρs.
3.2 Identification of variance components
Equations (6) and (7) are not directly applicable for regression analysis because
vi is unobservable. To account for the effect of unobserved vi, a multi-choice
version of the Heckman selection correction model (Heckman, 1979) is used.
As a first stage, a latent index model (3) is estimated using ordered probit.
The model is used to calculate generalized residuals of the schooling model4,
λsi =
φ (κs − ziθ)− φ (κs+1 − ziθ)
Φ (κs+1 − ziθ)− Φ (κs − ziθ) ,
where φ (·) is the probability density function of a standard normal distribution
and Φ (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distri-
bution. Adding λsi as a regressor to (6) accounts for the correlation between
unobserved schooling factor and education level. The expected value of observed
wages from the point of view of the researcher can now be written as
E [ysit | si = s, xit, vi] = αs + xitβ + σsρsλi. (8)
Calculating the difference between realized and expected wages gives
ysit − E [ysit | si = s, xit, vi] = σs − σsρs + ψst. (9)
Variance of (9) equals the measure of uncertainty, τ2st. Additionally, (9) im-
plies that whenever ρs 6= 0, selection leads to a truncation of the observed in-
come variance which, in turn, leads to an understatement of income uncertainty
4In the case of a binary schooling variable, the generalized residuals would boil down to
Inverse Mills’ ratios.
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compared to the case we would observe if education was randomly assigned to
individuals. The degree of understatement is given by 5:
δsi = λ2si −
(κs − ziθ)φ (κs − ziθ)− (κs+1 − ziθ)φ (κs+1 − ziθ)
Φ (κs+1 − ziθ)− Φ (κs − ziθ) .
The variance of transitory component can be identified from the residuals of
the within-individual model,
(yit − y¯i) = (xit − x¯i)β −
(
ξsit − ξ¯si
)
, (10)
where bars denote time averages of the corresponding variables (note that time-
invariant individual regressors, including λsi, are subsumed in the fixed effects)
and ξsit = ψstεsit. The procedure for estimating ψˆ2st is discussed in detail in
Appendix A.
The regression coefficients αˆs,βˆ and ˆρsσs = γˆs can be identified using a
between-individuals model
y¯i = αs + x¯iβ + γsλ¯si + ωi. (11)
The error term in (11) is, by equation (9),
ωi = σsesi + ξ¯si − γsλsi,
and its variance is
V ar [ωi | Si = s] = σ2s − γ2sδsi + ψ2st
Solving this for σ2s gives the estimator for time invariant individual specific
variance of wages for each schooling level,
σˆ2s = V̂ ar [ωi | Si = s] + γˆ2s ¯ˆδs − ψˆ2st, (12)
where, again, bars denote averages over individuals. The second term γˆ2s
¯ˆ
sδ in
equation (12) is needed to correct for the truncation of variances due to self
selection. Each term in equation (7) is now identified:
τˆ2st = σˆ
2
s − γˆ2s + ψˆ2st (13)
4 Data
The data used in this paper is a random sample of 46321 individuals from
a Finnish Census. I limit my attention to working males and females aged
between 28 and 43. I assume that by the age of 28, people have finished their
5λi and δi are derived in Maddala (1987) under the assumption of joint normality.
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education. An educational category of an individual is defined as the education
they have at the youngest age they are observed in the panel. It is possible
that individuals educate themselves further after the age of 28, but as my main
interest is, how well individuals are able to predict their income in their youth, I
interpret individuals’ decision to re-educate themselves at later ages as a realized
uncertainty, which should not be controlled for.6
The panel spans 1994-2009, adding up to a total of 244637 individual-year
observations for men and 213840 for women. The composition of the sample
is summarized in Table 1. The panel is constructed in a way that even the
youngest cohort is observed for six years. I have limited my attention to in-
dividuals who were born after 1966 to make sure that an educational reform
which took place in Finland in the early 1970’s does not differently affect the
cohorts under study.7
The educational categories are defined according to the standard classifica-
tion of education. I do not discriminate between fields of education but only
levels as the goal of this paper is to study the returns of an attained degree rather
than returns to years of education. The specification used allows the marginal
return to schooling to vary according to the level of schooling completed. Us-
ing the highest degree attained also mitigates the effect of measurement errors,
since years of education are usually imputed using average years of education
needed to complete a degree, which introduces measurement error.
As already mentioned, the risk of unemployment constitutes a considerable
part of the total income uncertainty. The choice of the outcome variable reflects
this; the dependent variable in income regressions is the log of total yearly tax-
able income which, in addition to wages and entrepreneurial income, includes
taxable income transfers but excluding income from capital gains. As a result,
the observed income streams allow for potential spells of unemployment.8 How-
ever, if a person drops out of the workforce entirely, she only contributes to the
estimation for the years when she is either unemployed or working. The variance
of yearly total income is, by definition, comprised of three components, hourly
wages, hours worked and the means-tested income transfers. Consequently, un-
less the covariances of the three components are very large and negative, the
total variances will be higher than the variance of hourly wages (see, e.g. Abowd
6In practice this is rather rare. Only roughly five percent of individuals in the lowest
education category get a higher degree during the time in the panel. For higher education
categories, the proportion of people who re-educate themselves are in the order of 1 percentage.
7The goal of this reform was to standardize the quality of comprehensive education within
the country. Consequently, people born before 1966 had a different school system from those
born after 1966. In particular, before the reform, the quality of comprehensive education varied
a great deal between regions. In addition, the reform resulted in removal of one educational
tracking stage. For details about the reform, see e.g., Pekkarinen et al. (2009).
8Also (former) self-employed individuals are entitled to unemployment transfers.
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& Card 1989).9
The income concept may introduce a problem of its own, since not working
may be either voluntary or involuntary. To separate the involuntarily unem-
ployed from voluntary workforce non-participants I include only the observations
where the main type of activity of an individual is either working or unemployed
in the estimation10. For example, if a women is on a maternity leave for one
year, but is either working or unemployed for nine years, she contributes to the
estimation for the years when she is not on a maternity leave.
The approach chosen leaves some (likely mis-classified) observations with
zero income. I omit these observations. This does not affect the main results,
because the proportion of zero-observations is very small (less than 2% of ob-
servations)11. To ensure comparability between years, the measure of income is
deflated to EUR 2009 using the Consumer Price Index.
I do not have a reliable information on whether workers are part-time or full-
time. Therefore, to some extend, the uncertainty measures also reflect voluntary
part-time work. Nonetheless, the proportion of part-time workers is rather small
in comparison to most developed countries. The proportion of part-time workers
is 9.2% for men and 16.9% for women. Further, working part-time is virtually
nonexistent in professional and management positions (where most peopleare
likely in education categories 3 or 4) (Eszter, 2011).
The vector of controls in Equation (2) includes paternal and maternal ed-
ucation classified using the same four-level classification which is used for in-
dividuals’ own education, a measure for family income calculated as the sum
the income of mother and income of father and nine dummies for family socioe-
conomic status. Family background characteristics are measured at age 14 if
possible. In addition, controls for first language, nationality and the region of
residence in adulthood are included.
Estimation of Equation (11) necessitates an instrument excluded from the
income equation (2). The region of residence in youth is used as an instru-
ment.1213 The assumption is that the region of residence is correlated with
individuals’ access to higher education but not their income after controlling for
9Low et al. (2010) discuss a model which separates individual productivity and firm-worker
match specific unemployment risks from one another in a structural framework. The depen-
dent variable in this paper, total taxable income, should be interpreted as a combination of
productivity and match specific risks, but measuring the respective contributions of these two
parts is beyond the scope of this paper.
10In general, for an individual to be classified as unemployed (and be eligible for unemploy-
ment benefits), she must agree to accept a job if offered one.
11None of the results qualitatively change whether I exclude them or impute a small positive
income value for these observations.
12Childhood information is collected from censuses. Censuses were administered in 1970,
1975, 1980, 1985 and yearly from 1988 onwards.
13A similar instrument is used, among others, by Suhonen et al. (2010) for Finland, Card
(1993) for the U.S. and Bedi & Gaston (1999) for Honduras.
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other observable characteristics. Consequently I need to exclude individuals who
have no information on their place of residence at youth. The estimation results
provided in Section 4.1 support the notion that the instrument is relevant.
As discussed by Card (1993), the place of residence in youth may affect
income because of differences in local supply of education, but also because
family background is correlated with place of residence. For this reason family
background variables are controlled for. In addition, Card points out that dif-
ferences in comprehensive schooling resources may affect subsequent income. In
the case of Finland, comprehensive education is arranged in public schools with
very small differences in resources and quality (Kirjavainen, 2009). In addition,
international evidence suggests that the impact of school quality on learning
(Kramarz et al., 2009) and income (Betts, 1995) is rather small even in the
context of less standardized comprehensive schooling. Finally, to control for
differences in local labor market conditions in the presence of imperfect labor
mobility, I control for job location in adulthood in the income equation. Despite
controlling for family background and job location characteristics, it might still
be the case that the instrument is correlated with the outcome. If this is the
case, the estimates for ρs overestimate the true parameter value. I discuss this
possibility in Section 6.
Figure 1 plots the estimated averages and standard deviations of log incomes
for each panel year calculated from the sample described in Table 2. It is
apparent that the mean income rises with education. Differences in the standard
deviations of incomes are quantitatively much smaller, but some aspects can
already be noted. First, people with only a compulsory education have the
largest standard deviations of incomes. The standard deviation of male income
in the lowest education category is especially large. The relative contribution of
heterogeneity, permanent differences and transitory differences remains unclear.
Using the method outlined in the previous section, it is possible to disentangle
them from one another
Control variables, which capture the observed heterogeneity, are summarized
in Table 2. Not surprisingly, the distribution of family background variables is
virtually identical between sexes. There are larger differences in the distribution
of education levels. The proportion of men with a basic or secondary education
is larger than women. Conversely, there are more women with at least a tertiary
level education.14
14The fact that women have overtaken men in terms of their education is a common finding
in most industrialized countries (Barro & Lee, 2010).
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Figure 1: Means (left panel) and variances (right panel) of yearly incomes by
year for men and women.
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Table 1: Sample sizes used in estimation.
Year of birth Sample size (men) Sample size (women) Year-obs. (men) Year-obs. (women) Years
1966 2742 2543 38576 33335 1994-2009
1967 2696 2510 35330 30382 1995-2009
1968 2530 2501 31253 28601 1996-2009
1969 2318 2213 26752 23623 1997-2009
1970 2417 2211 25729 21475 1998-2009
1971 2118 2155 20589 19216 1999-2009
1972 2134 2056 18905 16643 2000-2009
1973 2100 1928 16462 13915 2001-2009
1974 2226 2146 15612 13739 2002-2009
1975 2492 2285 15429 12911 2003-2009
Total 23773 22548 244637 213840
5 First and second stage estimates
5.1 First stage: schooling choice
Equation (3) is estimated by an ordered probit. The estimated model includes
family background measures and the instrument for education. Table 3 shows
the test statistics for the relevance of the instruments. The relevance of instru-
ment using linear education as the dependent variable is also reported because
there are no rule-of-thumb test statistic values for the relevance of instruments
maximum likelihood models.. Educational categories are converted to years of
education using average times-to-degree measured in full years.15 This intro-
duces noise to the dependent variable. Consequently the F-statistics reported
in Table 3 might represent a lower bound for the effect of the instruments on
education. Nonetheless, even the F-statistics of the linear model suggest that
the instruments are highly relevant.
5.2 Second stage: average returns to schooling
This section presents estimates for the average returns to education. The re-
ported estimates are based on the between model (11), where average yearly
income of an individual is regressed on individual characteristics, schooling vari-
able, mean age, mean age squared and the generated regressor λsi.
To account for the fact that λsi is a generated regressor, the standard errors
are calculated using a block bootstrap procedure, where 200 samples of size
N are drawn with replacement from the original population. For each boot-
strap draw k, the estimates αˆks ,βˆk and γˆks are calculated. Expected values and
standard errors of the parameters are calculated from the distribution of these
bootstrap draws.
The parameter estimates and their standard errors are presented in the sec-
ond column of Table 4. The effect of education on income is nonlinear with
15These are 9 years for the compulsory level, 12 years for the secondary level, 15 for the
lower tertiary education and 17 for the master’s level education.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables.
Men Women Men Women
Time invariant variables Family background
Education Father’s education
Compulsory education 0.18 0.15 Compulsory education 0.53 0.53
(0.38) (0.36) (0.5) (0.5)
Secondary 0.52 0.45 Secondary 0.25 0.25
(0.50) (0.5) (0.43) (0.43)
Lowest tertiary 0.21 0.25 Lower tertiary 0.15 0.15
(0.41) (0.43) (0.36) (0.36)
Bachelor or more 0.09 0.16 University 0.06 0.06
(0.29) (0.37) (0.24) (0.24)
First language Mother’s education
Finnish 0.950 0.951 Compulsory education 0.52 0.52
(0.218) (0.216) (0.48) (0.5)
Swedish 0.048 0.048 Secondary 0.31 0.31
(0.215) (0.214) (0.46) (0.46)
Other 0.002 0.001 Lowest tertiary 0.15 0.15
(0.040) (0.032) (0.36) (0.36)
Nationality Bachelor or more 0.03 0.03
Finnish 0.998 0.999 (0.17) (0.17)
(0.042) (0.032)
Other 0.002 0.001 Family income (in 100 EUR 2009) 394.23 393.401
(0.042) (0.032) (253.06) (253.01)
Instrument for education Average ages in years
Region residence in youth 1994 28 28
Uusimaa 0.20 0.21 1997 30 30
(0.40) (0.41) 2000 31 31
Varsinais-Suomi 0.08 0.08 2003 33 33
(0.27) (0.27) 2006 36 36
Satakunta 0.05 0.05 2009 39 39
(0.22) (0.22)
Kanta-Häme 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.17)
Pirkanmaa 0.08 0.08
(0.27) (0.27)
Päijät-Häme 0.04 0.04
(0.2) (0.2)
Kymenlaakso 0.04 0.04
(0.2) (0.2)
Etelä-Karjala 0.03 0.03
(0.17) (0.17)
Etelä-Savo 0.03 0.04
(0.17) (0.2)
Pohjois-Savo 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22)
Pohjois-Karjala 0.03 0.04
(0.17) (0.2)
Keski-Suomi 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22)
Etelä-Pohjanmaa 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22)
Pohjanmaa 0.04 0.03
(0.2) (0.17)
Keski-Pohjanmaa 0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.14)
Pohjois-Pohjanmaa 0.08 0.07
(0.27) (0.26)
Kainuu 0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.14)
Lappi 0.05 0.05
(0.22) (0.22)
Itä-Uusimaa 0.02 0.02
(0.14) (0.14)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Calculations are based on a random sample of individuals who are
born between 1966–1975 and are between 28 and 43 years old. N is the sample size of time-invariant variables.
Year-observations report the average number of years an individual is observed in the data.
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Table 3: Test statistics for relevance of instrument.
Men Women
Dependent variable: categorical education Likelihood ratio statistic 334.66 417.06
Ordered probit [0.00] [0.00]
Dependent variable: education in years F-statistic 17.06 22.74
Linear model [0.00] [0.00]
Notes: P-values in brackets. Instrument for education is the region of residence in youth. Both models include
controls for parents’ education, family income, nationality, first language and year of birth.
respect to level of education. Most educated individuals accrue the highest
marginal returns.
To facilitate comparability to previous literature on monetary returns to
education, also IV estimates for the average return to education are reported
in the third column of Table 4. They are reported for reference, but are not
used when estimating uncertainty parameters. The IV estimates are somewhat
larger than the corresponding estimates based on the selection model.
Without selectivity correction, the positive correlation between schooling of
individuals and the residual in the income equation would result in an upward
bias in the estimated returns to income. This bias arises if some of the un-
observable characteristics (a high draw of esi) are positively correlated with
the schooling choice of an individual. This happens, for example, if the people
with high income potential are also those who self-select into higher education
(Griliches, 1977).
In the context of the current model, the correlation between income and
schooling presents itself in positive values of the correction term γs. There is
limited evidence of this: for men the estimate of the correction terms for lowest
education categories γ1 and γ2 and for the correction term for the highest edu-
cation category γ4 for women are statistically significantly positive conventional
significance levels. The correction terms for other levels of schooling are not
statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. Even the correc-
tion terms that differ statistically significantly from zero are qualitatively rather
small. 16
The error structure given in Equation (5) implies that γs = ρsσs in con-
junction with the finding my estimate for ρˆ is very small suggests that the
unobservable heterogeneity for each education level is very small. This implies
that, either, individuals have very little private information on their compara-
tive advantage not captured by the observable characteristics, or, alternatively,
individuals do not act on their private information on potential incomes.
A possible concern for the validity of the results of this paper is that they
hinge on the assumption of joint normality of error terms and the linear depen-
16The fact that OLS and two-stage estimates are very close to one another, is a classic sign
of a weak instruments (e.g. Bound et al. 1995). Notice, however that the first stage results
point to instruments being highly relevant. The possibility that instruments are invalid, or
correlated with the outcome, is discussed more closely in Section 6.3.
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dence between mean incomes and the selection term. To shed some light on the
concern, I have performed the test described in Vella (1998, pp. 137-138) and
estimated Equation (11) where in addition to the Inverse Mills’ Ratio, second
and third degree polynomials of the Inverse Mills’ Ratios are used as regressors.
This allows me to test for possible deviations from joint normality of unobserv-
ables in schooling and income equations. The tests for the joint significance of
the higher order polynomial always fail to reject the null hypothesis of linearity.
This speaks in favor of the assumption of the joint normality.
Confidence on the distributional assumptions is further strengthened by the
fact that the estimates of |ρˆ| < 1 and δˆsi ∈ [0, 1] for all individuals, which is
consistent with normality (notice that no restrictions on ρˆ and δˆ are placed).
Nonetheless, even though the assumption of normality is not immediately re-
jected, some caution should be exercised when interpreting the results, since
they are obviously conditional on the distributional assumptions.
Table 4: Second stage estimates.
Men Education categories Years of education
Education OLS Corrected for selection OLS IV
Secondary educ. 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.09*** 0.13***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Lower tertiary educ 0.47*** 0.45***
(0.01) (0.04)
University 0.74*** 0.73***
(0.01) (0.07)
Selection correction term
Compulsory educ. 0.03**
(0.01)
Secondary educ. 0.02*
(0.01)
Lower tertiary 0.01
(0.02)
Bachelor or more 0.01
(0.03)
Women Education categories Years of education
Education OLS Corrected for selection OLS IV
Secondary educ. 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.11***
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Lower tertiary educ 0.37*** 0.38***
(0.01) (0.06)
University 0.77*** 0.72***
(0.01) (0.07)
Selection correction term
Compulsory educ. -0.01
(0.02)
Secondary educ. 0.00
(0.01)
Lowest tertiary 0.00
(0.01)
Bachelor or more 0.04*
(0.02)
Notes: Estimates are based on a between-individuals model. Standard errors in parenthesis. For the OLS and IV
models, standard errors are based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent OLS covariance matrix.
For the selection corrected model standard errors are based on 200 bootstrap replications. In addition to variables
reported, both models include controls for parents’ education, family income, nationality, first language and year
of birth, age and age squared. In columns 1 and 2, the education is measured as a categorical education variable.
In columns 3 and 4, the education categories are transformed into years of education using the typical
time-to-education measures.
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6 Uncertainty estimates
6.1 Main estimates
The estimates for the permanent and transitory components of income uncer-
tainty at each education level are reported in this section. Standard errors of
each variance component are again calculated from 200 bootstrap resamples.
The uncertainty estimates are reported in Table 5. Since the error structure
assumed implies that unobserved heterogeneity is not correlated with the tran-
sitory shocks, the total wage uncertainty is a sum of two components: transitory
shocks and permanent earnings variance purged from the effects of private in-
formation.
I first discuss the transitory variance estimates. Since transitory shocks are
time-varying, I start by reporting the time-means of the transitory component
(denoted by ψ¯2s). Among men, individuals in the lowest education group face
the highest transitory income shocks. People with at least a secondary level
education face similar transitory income shocks regardless of education. The
estimation results are almost entirely opposite for women: transitory shock
variances are almost constant among the three lowest education categories. The
variances of transitory shocks are somewhat higher in the group with the highest
education compared to other groups, even though the difference is qualitatively
small. The differences between the transitory shocks of men and women are
otherwise rather small, but men with only a basic level education face the highest
transitory income shocks. The time-profile of the variance of transitory shocks
can be seen from Figure 2; they are rather similar between education groups and
sexes, which supports the idea that transitory income shocks are mostly driven
by macroeconomic conditions in, for example, unemployment and job turnover.
Turning to permanent income variance, I find that education decreases per-
manent income differences considerably for men; having a secondary degree de-
creases permanent income uncertainty by 23%. Permanent income uncertainty
decreases by another 15% with a tertiary level education. The difference be-
tween lower tertiary and university level education are statistically insignificant.
In total, the permanent inequality is over 35% larger for the lowest education
category in comparison to highest education category. The effect of education on
permanent income variance is of similar magnitude for women and men. Having
a secondary level education decreases permanent income variance by 30%. The
uncertainty decreases further with a tertiary level education, but the differences
between lower tertiary and university education is indistinguishable from zero
for men and small and positive for women. Despite the marginal effects being
similar, the level of permanent uncertainty is considerably larger for men than
women regardless of the level of education. The differences in permanent in-
comes are twice as large for men than for women in the two highest education
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categories. Transitory and total income inequality levels are plotted in Figure
3.
To get a better grasp of the effects of education on average return and un-
certainty, Figure 4 plots the marginal effects of completed education on average
income and income uncertainty. Completing a secondary education decreases
income uncertainty of men more than that of women. A tertiary level education
has a small negative effect on male and female earnings uncertainty. Completing
an university level education increases uncertainty somewhat; this effect is, how-
ever, statistically significant for men but not for women. The returns-to-degree
estimates are similar among men and women on all levels of education.
Table 5: Estimates of income variance components.
Men
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock1 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Marginal effects2 -0.02*** -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Permanent component3 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.11
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Marginal effects4 -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.00
(0.006) (0.006) (0.01)
Effect of private information on permanent component5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Total wage uncertainty6 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.18
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Marginal effects7 -0.06*** -0.02*** 0.01
(0.006) (0.006) (0.01)
Women
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock1 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Marginal effect2 -0.002 -0.002* 0.005**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Permanent component3 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.05
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Marginal effect4 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01
(0.005) (0.003) (0.01)
Effect of private information on permanent component5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Total wage uncertainty6 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.13
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Marginal effect7 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.01
(0.004) (0.003) (0.05)
1 ψ¯2s
2 ψ¯2s − ψ¯2s−1
3 σ2s
4 σ2s - σ
2
s−1
5 γ2s
6 ψ¯2s − γ2s + σ2s = τ2s
7 τ2s − τ2s−1
Notes: Variance component decompositions are based on Equation (13) with region of residence in youth as an
instrument. Standard errors from 200 bootstrap resamples in parenthesis. Education categories are: 1. compulsory
education; 2. secondary education; 3. lowest tertiary education; 4. bachelor level education or higher.
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Figure 2: Transitory shock variances year by year.
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Figure 4: Marginal effects of completing a degree on mean income (horizontal
axis) and uncertainty (vertical axis) for men (black symbols) and women (gray
symbols). The dashed lines represent the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals
of return and uncertainty estimates on the corresponding axes.
6.2 Comparison to U.S. studies
My uncertainty estimates differ from those obtained in Chen (2008). Complet-
ing an education is found to decrease income uncertainty at lower education
levels, but the effect is close to zero or even marginally positive for university
graduates, whereas Chen’s results suggest an U-shaped profile of income uncer-
tainty where the highest and lowest education categories face the highest income
uncertainty. Chen conjectures that the high income uncertainty of university
graduates is related to the fact that they are able to choose their occupation
from a wider pool of potential occupations, which is also reflected in their per-
manent income differences. It is possible that also Finnish university graduates
are able to choose their occupation from a wider pool, but their income uncer-
tainty is still smaller than that of lower educated individuals. It seems plausible
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that this is due to smaller risk of unemployment of more educated individuals.
Perhaps a more surprising finding is the very small unobserved heterogene-
ity. This is in stark contrast to the estimates based on data from the U.S.17 For
example, Cunha & Heckman (2007) conclude that up to 50% of the ex post vari-
ance in income of college graduates is attributable to unobserved heterogeneity,
i.e. is foreseeable by individuals making their choice on whether or not to attend
college. A potential explanation for the results is the choice of measure of in-
come. The studies based on U.S. data use either a long period average earnings
(Cunha & Heckman, 2007, 2008; Cunha et al., 2005), or average hourly wage
(Chen, 2008), which both arguably contain less variation than the yearly total
income. Therefore, the correlation between residuals in schooling and income
equations, which is used to identify unobserved heterogeneity, is mechanically
smaller in absolute value.
A second partial explanation is that I target people in their youth. As the
nine-year comprehensive school is mandatory, it may indeed be the case that
young people making their choice on whether or not to attend higher education
have limited information on their future incomes at the age of fifteen. In addi-
tion, early-career earnings are usually more volatile, or more uncertain. Since
the Finnish comprehensive education is extremely standardized and allows for
little differentiation in school curricula between skill groups, it may convey less
private information to students about their future incomes and, therefore lead
to a smaller unobserved heterogeneity, than a less standardized system would.
However, even though the unobserved heterogeneity is found to be smaller
than in the U.S., this does not necessarily imply that people would have less
information on their potential future income streams. Rather, it seems plau-
sible, that, given the high amount of redistribution and collective bargaining
in Finnish labor market, people would have a rather good perception on their
potential future income, but this perception is not correlated with individual
characteristics which are unobservable to the econometrician.
6.3 Sensitivity of results to the instrument
Even though I control for a variety of background characteristics in both first
and second stages, the validity of the instrument is somewhat questionable. It is
possible that the instrument has a direct effect on income even after controlling
for the elements of x. To see the underlying intuition, note that the possibly
17Mazza et al. (2011) attempts to replicate the results in Chen (2008) using the same data
but a different instrument, but they get very different results. In particular, their estimates for
the unobserved heterogeneity are almost indistinguishable from zero regardless of education
level and that the length of education and uncertainty are positively correlated. The same
model applied to British data shows uncertainty decreasing with education and very small
unobserved heterogeneity, while German data do not fit the model at all.
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endogeneous instrument may affect the outcome through two distinct channels,
through its independent effect on the probability of completing an education,
and through direct effect of the instrument on income. More formally, the term
γs in equation (11) can be written as
γsλsi (ziθ, Si = s) = cov(vi, ωi | z, ) + cov(ziγ, ωi | Si = s, xi). (14)
The first term in the expression is the correlation between the unobserved school-
ing coefficient and the education. The second term is the covariance between
income and the instrument when schooling and other observables except the
instrument are kept constant. Equation (14) also provides a test for the ex-
ogeneity of the instrument; in a sub-sample, where schooling is constant, the
instruments should have no predictive power on income after controlling for x.
The tests for the joint significance of instruments are implemented separately
for each schooling category and both sexes and reported in Table 6.
The instrument is found to have a direct effect to earnings in comprehensive
schooling category for men and in the secondary education category for women.
Consequently, for other education levels, the exogenous instrument assumption
seems to hold. It should also be noted, that the endogeneity of the instrument
biases the estimate of ρs upwards in absolute value. Therefore, it seems plausible
that my estimates for ρˆs represent an upper limit of the true parameter value.18
To further study, to what extend the possible endogeneity of instrument
drives the results, I have estimated the model without an exclusion restriction.
The estimation results are presented in tables 7 and 8. The results are very
similar to those reported in Tables 4 and 5. Since the two alternative specifi-
cations give very similar, and quantitatively small, estimates for the unobserved
heterogeneity and, if anything, the main estimates are biased upwards in abso-
lute value, it seems clear that unobserved heterogeneity is, indeed, very small.
Table 6: Test for the exogeneity of the instrument.
Men Women
Comprehensive education 1.67* 0.77
[0.03] [0.75]
Secondary education 1.499 1.47.
[0.11] [0.08]
Lower tertiary education 1.38 1.30
[0.11] [0.17]
University education 0.61 1.09
[0.90] [0.35]
Tests for the joint significance of instruments
in samples with the same education. P-values in brackets.
18Also the IV estimates are somewhat larger than previous estimates from Finland (Uusitalo
1999). It should, however, be noted, that the earnings measures are not entirely comparable
because the measure used in this paper consists of a compilation of earnings and unemployment
risks. If education increases earnings and decreases the probability of being unemployed, this
would lead to higher mean return to education.
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Table 7: Second stage estimates (estimated without an exclusion restriction).
Men Education categories
Return to education level Corrected for selection Selection correction term
Upper secondary educ. 0.25*** Comprehensive educ 0.00
(0.54) (0.01)
Lower tertiary educ 0.47*** Upper secondary educ. 0.00
(0.05) (0.01)
University 0.73*** Lower tertiary educ 0.00
(0.07) (0.02)
University 0.03*
(0.02)
Women Education categories
Return to education level Corrected for selection Comprehensive educ 0.00
Upper secondary educ. 0.20*** (0.02)
(0.05) Upper secondary educ. 0.00
Lower tertiary educ 0.39*** (0.01)
(0.05) Lower tertiary educ 0.00
University 0.74*** (0.01)
(0.06) University 0.02
(0.02)
Notes: Estimates are based on a model without an instrument. Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors are
based on 200 bootstrap replications. In addition to variables reported, both models include controls for location of
residence, parents’ education and family income, nationality, first language and year of birth, age and age squared.
Table 8: Estimates of income variance components (estimated without an ex-
clusion restriction).
Men
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock1 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Permanent component2 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Effect of private information on permanent component3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08)
Total wage uncertainty4 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.18
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Women
Education category
1 2 3 4
Variance of transitory shock1 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Permanent component2 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.05
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Effect of private information on permanent component3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Total wage uncertainty4 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.14
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
1 ψ¯2s
2 σ2s
3 γ2s
4 ψ¯2s − γ2s + σ2s = τ2s
Notes: Variance component decompositions are based on Equation (13) estimated without an instrument.
Standard errors from 200 bootstrap resamples in parenthesis. Education categories are: 1. compulsory education;
2. upper secondary education; 3. lowest tertiary education; 4. bachelor level education or higher.
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7 Conclusions
This paper applies a simple model for identifying potential income distributions.
The model is based on the residuals of the income regression equation. The vari-
ance of residuals is comprised of two components: uncertainty and unobserved
heterogeneity. The uncertainty is further comprised of two components: per-
manent income differences and transitory shocks. Using a parametric model
for selection, this paper disentangles the role of unobserved heterogeneity from
permanent income differences. This paper departs from previous studies in two
ways: in addition to wages, measure of income also includes transfers to people
who are not working. This gives a possibility to include also the unemployed in
the estimation allowing for a more complete picture of income uncertainty. Sec-
ond, to facilitate comparison of earnings processes of men and women, separate
models for men and women are estimated.
The results indicate that education is a good investment: in addition to
having higher mean income, more educated individuals have smaller perma-
nent income differences and face smaller transitory income shocks, even after
correcting for selection. Moreover, my results indicate that men face consider-
ably riskier income processes. For example, men with a basic level education is
about 33% higher than women with a similar education. The results show that
the higher male income variance is by and large driven by permanent earnings
differences; no differences in unobserved heterogeneity are found. In addition,
transitory shocks affect both genders and almost all education groups symmetri-
cally. Only men in the lowest education category face larger transitory earnings
shocks.
The estimates on share of unobserved heterogeneity in permanent income
differences are qualitatively very small. This is a stark difference from previ-
ous studies, which mostly use data from the U.S. and find that the effect of
unobserved heterogeneity may be up to 50% of permanent income differences.
I argue that this result is likely driven by the choice of dependent variable or
the relatively young estimation sample. Both of these factors increase the noise
in the dependent variable compared to specifications typically used in studies
using data from the U.S.
The estimation method applied in this paper take advantage of observed
choices made by individuals to infer their information sets and, consequently,
unobserved heterogeneity. A possible caveat in the analysis, is that if people
know their expected incomes, but do not act on this information, the method
which is based on their observed choices necessarily understates the unobserved
heterogeneity. This may be a particularly relevant concern in the case of Fin-
land, where higher education is entirely publicly funded.
The focus of this paper has been quantifying the effect of education on
earnings uncertainty but the specific channel through which education affects
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earnings uncertainty is somewhat unclear. A classic explanation (e.g. Willis
& Rosen, 1979) is that each level of education gives access to a distinct labor
market with distinct income processes. In addition, education has been shown
to have a variety of other positive effects on behavior. For example, it leads to
a better health (Lleras-Muney, 2005) and reduces antisocial behavior (Lochner,
2004). Furthermore, these effects are found to be larger for men than for women.
It is plausible, that at least a portion of the high earnings uncertainty of low
educated males is attributable to these behavioral factors.
Since correcting for selection has only a small effect on the estimates of
means and variances of incomes conditional on education level, it appears that,
in the case of Finland, not correcting for selection has only a marginal impact
on the estimated returns to education and uncertainty involved.
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Appendix A: Estimating ψˆ2st from the residuals of
the within-model
Equation (10):
(yit − y¯i) = (xit − x¯i)β −
(
ξsit − ξ¯si
)
.
Assuming that observations are missing at random and that εst and εst−k
are independent for all k 6= 0, the residual variance can be written as
V ar
(
ξsit − ξ¯si
)
= Wst =
(
1− 2
T
)
ψ2st +
Ωsi
T 2i
,
where Ti is number of observation years of observation i and Ωsi =
∑Ti
t=1 ψ
2
st.
Summing both sides up over t gives
Ti∑
t=1
Wst =
(
1− 2
T
)
Ωsi +
Ωsi
T
and solving this for Ωsi gives
Ωsi =
∑Ti
t=1Wst(
1− 1
T
) .
Plugging this back to the expression of V ar (νsti − ν¯si) and solving for ψ2st gives
ψ2st = Wst
Ti
Ti − 2 −
Ωst
Ti (Ti − 2) .
Finally, replacing Ti’s their sample average andWst with its consistent estimate
gives
ψˆ2st = Wˆst
T¯
T¯ − 2 −
Ωˆs
T¯
(
T¯ − 2) ,
where Ωˆs =
∑Ti
t=1 Wˆst(
1− 1
T¯
) .
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